Archives for January 2011

DISCRIMINATION/JUDICIAL REVIEW: Court not deprived of “jurisdiction” after 14-day deadline in §49-2-505(3)(c), may still consider equitable, constitutional principles… RR seeking judicial review of $368,240 HRC award to obese track laborer applicant entitled to present claim that Notice of Decision misfiled… dismissal for lack of jurisdiction reversed… Sherlock reversed.

BNSF conditionally offered Chad Cringle employment as a track laborer, but later denied employment on the basis that he presented a risk of harm to himself or others based on a statistical analysis of his height & weight. He filed a discrimination complaint in 7/08. HRB found reasonable cause. HO Spear awarded Cringle $368,240 for rejection by BN for perceived disability (obesity) without an IIA. (MLW 9/19/09). He issued and served notice of the decision 9/2/09. BN filed notice of appeal to HRC and request for an extension 9/22. Cringle objected that the 14-day deadline of §49-2-505(3)(c) had rendered the decision final and created a jurisdictional bar. HRC denied an extension and dismissed BN’s appeal. It did not hear evidence as to BN’s reasons for missing the deadline or evaluate whether it had good cause for an extension. BN petitioned for judicial review 11/2, arguing that HRC had authority to extend the 14-day deadline. It stated that it missed the deadline due to misfiling the decision and failing to calendar the deadline. Judge Sherlock concluded that he lacked subject jurisdiction to set aside HRC’s dismissal, but retained jurisdiction to enforce Spear’s damages award and to award attorney fees, and entered judgment for Cringle. BN appeals.

BN is correct that §49-2-505(3)(c) does not place a jurisdictional limitation on the court to entertain a petition for judicial review. The Legislature does not deprive courts of subject jurisdiction when it enacts filing or notice deadlines. We have emphasized the importance of not confusing untimely filing with subject jurisdiction. Miller (Mont. 2007); Davis (Mont. 2008). “Categorical time prescriptions” do not “withdraw” or “circumscribe” the court’s subject jurisdiction. Davis overruled “Gray, Pena, Wells, and other cases to the extent that they have held that the Legislature limited district court’s subject matter jurisdiction” by enacting time bars. We since have consistently confirmed that statutory filing deadlines do not affect subject jurisdiction. Johnston (Mont. 2008); Cobb (Mont. 2009); Lorang (Mont. 2008). Art. VII §4(1) provides that district courts have “original jurisdiction … in all civil matters and cases at law and in equity.” §4(2) provides that “the legislature may provide for direct review by the district court of decisions of administrative agencies.” Subject jurisdiction involves fundamental authority to hear & adjudicate cases or proceedings. Id. It “can never be forfeited or waived, nor can it be conferred by the consent of a party.” Davis. We have distinguished “categorical time prescriptions” from “jurisdictional provisions” that “delineate the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) … falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Miller. Regardless of the label, none of the judicially or statutorily created procedural deadlines deprives a court of subject jurisdiction. Miller; Davis; Johnston. Procedural time bars are affirmative defenses that are subject to forfeiture and waiver. Turenne (Mont. 2001). Generally, a litigant who properly raises a procedural time bar may expect it to be applied “regularly and consistently.” Redcrow (Mont. 1999). Procedural time bars, like the 14-day deadline in §49-2-505(3)(c) remain subject to constitutional review and equitable principles. This deadline may ultimately bar BN from a full appeal on the merits, but it does not deprive the District Court of subject jurisdiction over BN’s petition for review in District Court, which possesses jurisdiction to consider the arguments for application of equitable doctrines and constitutional principles. §2-4-702.

Stripped of its grandiose language, the Dissent contains no response to any of the case law on which this decision rests, and where it has relied on legal authority, it has relied on clearly distinguishable case law. It falls into the linguistic trap identified by this Court’s recent opinions when it attempts to distinguish “this jurisdiction” with the court’s authority. Under the Dissent’s approach, a court would be required to deny BN’s petition for judicial relief even had BN missed the deadline because a tornado destroyed the entire case file, and would “properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction” simply by tallying the days that have passed and issuing a denial of judicial review without a hearing regardless of whether good cause existed. Art. VII §4(2) does not so diminish and automate the court’s role.

BN asks the Court to remand to HRC to hear its motion for an extension of the 14-day deadline, citing Rule 6(b) and ARM 24.9.113 & 315. However, §49-2-505(4) permits BN to have appealed the HO’s decision to HRC only within the 14-day deadline. Only the District Court had authority to grant equitable relief from the procedural bar of 49-2-505(4) after the deadline expired. On remand, Sherlock shall hear BN’s alleged good cause for an extension. If he finds good cause, he shall order HRC to grant an extension and hear and determine the merits of BN’s appeal. If he does not find good cause he shall deny an extension and resolve any other matters presented by BN’s petition.

Morris, McGrath, Leaphart, Nelson.

Rice dissented: The Majority has misapplied jurisdictional principles, misinterpreted the Constitution, failed to follow our own holdings, and acted beyond its constitutional powers by legislating a “good cause” exception to virtually every procedural bar passed by the Legislature.

BNSF v. Cringle and HRC, DA 10-161, last brief 8/20/10, decided 12/30/10.

Benjamin Rechfertig & Jeff Hedger (Hedger Friend), Billings, for BN; Terry Trieweiler (Trieweiler Law Firm), Whitefish, for Cringle.