SENTENCING: Nexus between prescription drug MVA negligent homicide and alcohol condition not reviewed in revocation re-sentencing for failure to object below… Deschamps affirmed. [Read more…]
Restitution, prudent person test, lost income
RESTITUTION: Reasonable/prudent person test adopted… impracticability of renting tractor properly considered in ordering restitution for lost income from theft of tractor… Phillips affirmed. [Read more…]
Hunting/search & seizure, aerial observation
HUNTING/SEARCH/SEIZURE/SENTENCING: Officials’ innocent aerial observation of private property not a “search”… claim that warden trespassed on neighboring lands not raised below, not amenable to plain-error review… warrant not required to monitor (illegal) radio hunter conversations… search warrant supported by sufficient facts… warrant [Read more…]
Plea withdrawal, recanted PFMA allegation
PLEA WITHDRAWAL: Girlfriend’s recanting PFMA allegation months before guilty plea not new evidence for withdrawal… Watters affirmed. [Read more…]
Drugs/procedure/assistance, amended charge
DRUGS/PROCEDURE/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: New omnibus hearing not required following addition of lesser-included based on same facts… alternative charge not good cause for untimely motion to suppress… counsel not ineffective for not timely moving to suppress based on [Read more…]
Procedure/sentencing, instruction settling presence
PROCEDURE/PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT/SENTENCING: Constitutionality of §46-16-410(4) not considered first time on appeal in claim of denial of right to be present during settling of instructions… new trial properly denied based on Prosecutor’s reference to failure to call witnesses… parole conditions illegal, properly challenged first time on [Read more…]
Sentencing/revocation, credit card restitution
SENTENCING/REVOCATION: Revocation proper for failure to pay restitution to DOC for disbursement to credit cards or check that they had been paid… untimely challenge of restitution condition of original sentence… jail time improperly imposed because original suspended [Read more…]
DUI, officer “experience,” vehicle stop
DUI: Requirement that officers have certain amount of “experience” to make investigatory stop abandoned… relatively inexperienced deputy had reasonable grounds to believe driver DUI… McKeon affirmed.
Hill Co. Dep. Martin saw a pickup “barely moving” at 2:51 a.m., then pull over, stop, and shut off its lights. He pulled in behind and approached it. (The State asserted the Community Caretaker Doctrine but Judge McKeon simply stated that Martin “had probable cause/ reasonable grounds” to believe the driver was DUI.) David Brown rolled down his window and Martin smelled alcohol. He asked Brown if he was having any problems and Brown stated that he and his son argued and his son got out and walked away. He admitted that he had been drinking and explained that he had pulled over to wait for his son to return. Martin saw a beer container in the cupholder and observed that Brown’s speech was slow and slurred. He asked him to perform field tests. Brown was slow in exiting and had to lean on the truck, explaining that he had back problems. Martin improperly administered the HGN. Brown refused a breath test. Martin arrested him for DUI. He again improperly administered the HGN at the jail. He then read Brown the implied consent advisory. Brown again refused to take a breath test and his license was suspended. He petitioned for reinstatement on grounds that Martin did not have reasonable grounds to believe that he was DUI. McKeon denied his petition. Brown appeals.
Brown contends that based on “plain, unmistakable language” in Gopher (Mont. 1981), only an “experienced” officer can make the proper inferences as to DUI. He contends that Martin was lacking the requisite experience because he had only 4 prior DUI investigations and had been on the job less than a year. He also contends that there was not sufficient objective data from which inferences of DUI could be drawn. The idea that an officer has to have a certain amount of experience to make an investigatory stop & frisk comes from this Court’s early interpretations — or misinterpretations — of Cortez (US 1981). While Cortezreferred several times to “trained” officers, it referred only once to “experienced” officers — in the context of what an “experienced” officer might infer. It did not establish any requirement that only “experienced” officers could make such inferences. There is no Montana statute that carves out a class of officers as the only ones capable of particularized suspicion for a stop. Rather than requiring that each officer have a certain amount of experience, the test for particularized suspicion simply requires that the information available to the officer — whether rookie or veteran — be sufficient to allow a hypothetical “experienced” officer to have either particularized suspicion for a stop or probable cause for an arrest. Henceforth, for an officer to have particularized suspicion or reasonable grounds for an investigatory stop, he must be possessed of (1) objective data and articulable facts from which he can make certain reasonable inferences and (2) a resulting suspicion that the person has, is, or is about to commit an offense. While experience & training may be a factor in determining what sort of reasonable inferences he is entitled to make from his observations, they will not necessarily be the defining element. For example, a rookie on his 1st patrol may well be entitled to stop at 2 a.m. a vehicle that is driving slowly without lights and weaving across the lines, but might not be entitled to make reasonable inferences resulting in particularized suspicion or reasonable grounds to stop under circumstances which are demonstrably beyond his training or experience. The courts will look to the facts and totality of the circumstances of each case.
McKeon correctly concluded that Martin had reasonable grounds to believe that Brown was DUI. Brown contends that “virtually all” the data that Martin utilized were subjective, including the alcohol odor, the early morning hour, the vehicle’s slow movement, the sudden stop, the slurred/slow speech, the slow/staggered exit, and the explanation of a recently absent passenger when no one else was in the vicinity. He claims that the only objective data from which Martin could make any inferences of wrongdoing were Brown’s turning off the lights, admitting that he had been drinking, and the beer cup. He contends that because there was nothing improper about the way his pickup was parked, there was no objective evidence of any illegal activity. However, Martin did not act on one isolated observation, but drew inferences from several observations that indicated possible criminal activity. Clark (Mont. 2005).
Nelson, Leaphart, Cotter, Warner, Morris.
Brown v. State, DA 07-700, last brief 8/13/08, decided 3/3/09.
Jeremy Yellin, Havre, for Brown; Asst. AG Mark Fowler; Dep. Hill Co. Atty. Lindsay Osborne.
DUI/endangerment, wrong side of interstate
DUI/ENDANGERMENT: Particularized suspicion for stop and probable cause for arrest based on 50 miles on wrong side of interstate… speedy trial motion failed to state grounds with particularity… endangerment instruction properly omitted additional statutory language on tree spiking, proper instruction on “knowingly,” “knowingly” element [Read more…]
DUI, parking lot strike of unoccupied vehicle
DUI: Particularized suspicion to investigate parking lot strike of unoccupied vehicle, failure to leave note, motion to suppress properly denied… H. Brown affirmed (IOR I-3(d)(v)). [Read more…]
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